The Concept of the Aesthetic

Abstract

Can the contemporary concept of the ‘aesthetic’ be defended? Is it in good shape or is it sick? Should we retain it or dispense with it? The concept of the aesthetic is used to characterize a range of judgements and experiences. Let us begin with some examples of judgements which aestheticians classify as aesthetic, so that we have some idea of what we are talking about. These paradigm cases will anchor the ensuing discussion. Once we have some idea of which judgements are classified as aesthetic judgements, we can go on to ponder what, if anything, they have in common. We judge that things are beautiful or ugly, or that they have or lack aesthetic value or aesthetic merit. Let us call these judgements verdictive aesthetic judgements. (I group judgements of beauty and aesthetic value together.) We also judge that things are dainty, dumpy, graceful, garish, delicate, balanced, warm, passionate, brooding, awkward and sad. Let us call these judgements substantive aesthetic judgements. The objects and events about which we make verdictive and substantive judgements include both natural objects and works of art. Aestheticians have traditionally been concerned to understand the nature of verdictive judgements. Interest in substantive judgements, by contrast, is a novelty – something that has surfaced only since the Second World War. Interest in judgements of beauty and ugliness has a history of millennia, whereas interest in substantive judgements has a history of decades. The contemporary category of aesthetic judgements, as it is usually conceived, includes both verdictive judgements and substantive judgements. But ‘aesthetic’ is a term of art, and there is no right answer concerning how the word should be used. For example, the modern usage is quite unlike Kant’s. What is in question is the point of a classification which groups the beautiful together with the dainty and the dumpy. Is there anything to be said for such a classification? Or is it arbitrary? Are there relevant similarities which would make such an inclusive classification illuminating and worthwhile? The other face of the problem is over representational judgements. Examples of representational judgements are judgements to the effect that a work of art is of Napoleon or of a tree. Representational judgements are usually, but not always, excluded from the category of aesthetic judgements. Are there relevant dissimilarities which would make such exclusion illuminating and worthwhile? The issue is not one about aesthetic terms, since, as Roger Scruton has emphasized, there are many aesthetic descriptions which do not deploy aesthetic terms. (Scruton 1974; see also Sibley 1959, pp. 422–23, 446–48.) These are the metaphorical aesthetic descriptions. For example, we say that works of art are ‘delicate’ or