The Concept of subject in the philosophy of E. Husserl

Abstract

This article analyzes the elements of the concept of  subject traced in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl throughout all his works. The author follows the transformation of the views of German philosopher on the idea of subject. As well as their implementation in the context of phenomenological thought. Special attention is given to correlation between the works of Husserl of the early period and the later period.  It is noted that unlike the Cartesian or Kantian model of subjectivity, the egological subject for the first time conceptualizes intersubjectivity as the foundation for the development of the fundamentally new concept of understanding a human as a subject endowed with self-consciousness. The main conclusions consist in the following theses: despite the fact that the key role in the egological concept of subject belongs to the definition of evidence, intentionality, and reduction, the problem of cognition, considered in this article, is developed by Husserl as further complication of the Kantian approach; the egological concept of subject implements the concept of intersubjectivity, which demarcates the ideas of E. Husserl among other approaches towards the concept of subject. understanding the subject. On the one hand, intersubjectivity weakens the position of the idea of absolute autonomy of the subject’ while on the other hand, it is the new mechanism for legitimizing the subjective process of cognition and the truth itself, due to recognition of ego behind the figure of the Other.