The Concept of Social Construction

Abstract

The present paper attempts to clarify the social constructionist position by way of an analysis of its central concept, namely `social construction'. (1) Three central theses connected with this concept as used in epistemological debates are identified: (a) The production of knowledge is a creative interpretation process and cannot be adequately framed within a logicistic theory of knowledge. (b) In their experiments scientists actively aspire to produce results that accord with their theories. (c) Knowledge is always grounded in a background of contingent assumptions and local investigative practices. It is argued that none of these theses is incompatible with realism. (2) Thereafter, three central theses connected with the concept of social construction as used in debates concerning the subject matter of psychology are discussed: (a) The subject of psychology is not a natural kind but an artefact. (b) There is a reflexive relationship between psychological discourses and the subject of these discourses. (c) The subject of psychology cannot be adequately analysed in natural scientific terms. It is argued that these insights have important consequences for psychological research, and yet are unintelligible against the background of anti-realist presuppositions.