The Concept of Responsibility: Norms, Actions and Their Consequences

Abstract

We clarify the concept of responsibility – its conditions, meanings, syntax, forms, and ethical status. Our analysis of responsibility proceeds on the secondary level of ethics, i.e. it is focused on conceptual structure and insofar independent of exactly what primary ethical position one adopts (e.g. Kantian, utilitarian, Rawlsian,…). The concept of responsibility, in this understanding, is an ethically neutral concept: it does not by itself constitute any ethical claim. It is, however, an important vehicle for communicating and implementing given abstract norms into practical action. For, the concept of responsibility points to a wide range of practical questions of norm-oriented action, with particular attention to the actions’ consequences, and provides a heuristic to address them. For example: What does it mean to be responsible for the consequences of one’s actions? Who has to bear what kind of responsibility? What are the prerequisites and the limits of bearing responsibility? Thereby, the concept of responsibility establishes an architecture of argument to assess and guide actions.