The Concept of Rationality in Academic Science Teaching

Abstract

In this article we examine academic cultures from teaching perspective, with particular reference to science teaching, and argue that studies in this area seem to overlook concept of 'rationality' in analysing academic cultures. Inspired by early writings of Habermas, three different forms of'rationality' are discussed in relation to epistemological and social aspects of disciplinary communities. We have drawn on our extensive experience in academic staff development [1] in curriculum and teaching matters at University of Oslo, and we are particularly interested in consequences for science teaching and staff development at university level. The main ideas presented result from varied and lengthy exposure to academics from a wide variety of disciplines in their function as university teachers. In his recent book, Becher (1989) takes as one point of departure: the ways in which particular groups of academics organize their professional lives are intimately related to intellectual tasks on which they are engaged (p. 1). It is interesting to observe, however, that Becher limits his study to intellectual tasks related to research. Academics in tertiary educational institutions have (at least in Norway) three main functions: research, teaching and public enlightenment. In northern continental Europe, Humboldt academic tradition is still worshipped, although with some questioning of developments and practices. One of its corner-stones was combination of research and teaching, to benefit of both. Academics still consider this combination to be a successful one (Jensen, 1986), although is probably a universal trend that university teachers regard themselves as seekers after knowledge rather than as communicators of it (Becher, 1989, p. 3). In this article we approach academic disciplinary cultures from point of view of teaching activities of academics, not from research. In our experience, some patterns have recurred so frequently, at least within some 'academic tribes', that we feel justified in discussing them. The question is whether some typical modes of thinking (forms of rationality) that are relevant and valid in research invade teaching, where they might be less relevant, even invalid. We are still in process of struggling with issues at stake. If this attempt to focus on disciplines from natural sciencesas one example is not regarded as completely off target, we may be inspired to pursue enquiry into other clusters of disciplines. The article reflects our practical experience as 'staff developers' at university. We are, consequently, confident that main idea 'works in practice'. But does hold up in theory?