Abstract

Subject. The study addresses the improvement of risk management efficiency and the quality of lending decisions made by banks. Objectives. The aim is to present the bank management with a fair algorithm for risk management motivation on the one hand, and the credit management (business) on the other hand. Within the framework of the common goal to maximize risk-adjusted income from loans, this algorithm will provide guidelines for ‘risk management’ and ‘business’ functions on how to improve individual and overall efficiency. Methods. The study employs the discriminant analysis, type I and II errors, Lorentz curve modeling, statistical analysis, economic modeling. Results. The paper offers a mechanism for assessing the quality of risk management decisions as opposed to (or in support of) decisions of the lending business when approving transactions. The mechanism rests on the approach of stating type I and II errors and the corresponding classical metric of the Gini coefficient. On the ‘business’ side, the mechanism monitors the improvement or deterioration of the indicator of changes in losses in comparison with the market average. Conclusions. The study substantiates the stimulating ‘rules of the game’ between the ‘business’ and ‘risk management’ to improve the efficiency of the entire business, to optimize interactions within the framework of internal competition. It presents mathematical tools to calculate corresponding indicators of the efficiency of internally competing entities.

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