The Concept of "Interest" in the Philosophical and Political Legal Thought of Enlightenment Period

Abstract

This article discusses the basic directions of development of the concept of in the philosophical and political and legal opinions of the thinkers of the Enlightenment in Western Europe, covering the 17th-18th centuries that have passed a long evolutionary path that originated various interpretations and concepts. Theoretical prerequisites of the doctrine of interest, having emerged in the ancient philosophy, got some development during the Renaissance, in particular in the works of N. Machiavelli, who proclaimed the primacy of the public interest over private interests. The Enlightenment formed a whole galaxy of major thinkers, philosophers, politicians, scientists, who have made an invaluable contribution to the development of general philosophical and political legal opinion on human nature and society. The life and work of educators passed in the historical period of exacerbation of contradictions of feudal monarchical absolutism, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the formation and development of industrial production that caused the need for scientific and technical knowledge, as well as in social philosophy. The public and philosophical thought of the time was characterized by rationalism, free thought and the struggle against clericalism and adoption of materialistic ideas. In the political legal sphere the ideas of equality and freedom prevailed. The author emphasizes the views of T. Gobbs, F.-M. A. Voltaire, D. Diderot, J.-J. Roussaeu, C. A. Helvetius P.-H. d'Holbach and I. Kant about the nature of interests, their role in social development, the ratio of private and public interests in a fair state. The conducted analysis shows that the interest having a biological origin and social nature, is based on the needs of individuals and society, and from the content point of view is characterized by moral-psychological, aesthetic, spiritual, political, economic, legal and other aspects. Interest is not always a strong imperative, but evident in individual cases as a driving force for action in both the individual and the state and reflects the variety of forms and types of social interaction in the triad individual-society-state.