Abstract
This Article assesses the political consequences of the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr and the related cases establishing the one-person, one-vote rule for legislative redistricting. Through a set of new empirical tests, the Article examines the often-perverse effects of one person, one vote on political competition and representation in state legislatures. For four state senates the Article draws the 1960 district lines onto the 2000 political data and finds that the lines existing pre-Baker would usually be more representative than the lines currently in existence
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