The Complexity of Investment Spillover from New-Type Agricultural Business Entities to Small-Scale Farmers

Abstract

Aiming to clarify the leading roles of new-type agricultural business entities (abbreviated as NABEs) to small-scale farmers, integrated game models between NABEs and small-scale farmers are designed to verify the impact of scale economy and investment spillover on the equilibrium points of the game system. The influence of the investment spillover rate and the decision-making adjustment speed on the stability of the system are emphatically discussed. Numerical simulation shows that, with the increase of small-scale farmers’ decision-making adjustment speed, the system would successively show the phenomena of stability, period doubling bifurcation, chaos and discreteness. In the Cournot game, the two sides’ decision-making results such as investment intensity, selling price and eventual profits vary in the opposite direction. In the Stackelberg game of the basic mode, the two sides’ decision-making results are not evidently changed, and NABEs’ investment intensity, selling price and eventual profits are higher than those of small-scale farmers. In the order mode, system improvement can be realized by controlling the investment spillover rate. The research results indicate that with the increase of the adjustment speed of small-scale farmers’ decision-making, the repeated game decision-making aggravates the instability of the Cournot game system. This paper finds that the order pattern can make up for the scale weakness of small-scale farmers, and finally achieve a win-win situation for decision makers in the case of uncertain demands.