The Compleat German Economic Voter: New Pathways in Patrimonial and Positional Economic Voting

Abstract

Recent studies of economic voting suggest that beyond the traditional valence conception of voters rewarding or punishing incumbent administrations for economic performance, there are patrimonial (assets) and positional (economic policy) dimensions to the economic vote too. To date, investigations of economic voting in Germany have primarily concentrated on the valence model. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4 component included in the 2013 German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), our paper examines the multifaceted nature of economic voting in Germany. Our analysis reveals there are patrimonial and positional economic dimensions to the vote in Germany, implying that the compleat economic voter is also a German phenomenon. Beyond contributing to studies of German voting behaviour, our paper breaks new ground by unpacking individual heterogeneity associated with patrimonial and positional economic voting. We demonstrate political sophistication moderates to some extent the prevalence of asset motivated and economic policy voting. Patrimonial voting is somewhat more likely among the less politically sophisticated, while positional economic voting is somewhat more probable among highly sophisticated citizens. Our study confirms the multidimensionality of economic voting and also highlights the conditionality of patrimonial and positional economic voting is an individual level phenomenon.