Abstract
This paper analyzes the competitive impact of the recent import liberalization of the Japanese oil product market. In response to the import liberalization in March 1996, not only did the market price of gasoline decline sharply but also its domestic production kept rising and did not decline relative to imports. Moreover, its price fell substantially before the actual liberalization of the import. This paper demonstrates both theoretically and empirically that the theory of implicit cartel can explain such features of the impact of import liberalization very well. The paper also identifies the significantly positive welfare impact of such liberalization due to the expansion of supply in a market with a large tax wedge between price and cost and, possibly more importantly, due to the transformation of competitive conduct from unproductive investment for cartel-rent shifting into price cuts. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 1999, 13(4), pp. 397–423. Hitotsubashi University; and Keio University. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L40, F12, K21.
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