The Competition Council Between Independence and Dependence

Abstract

This research paper aims to investigate the extent to which the Competition Council truly distinguishes itself with sufficient independence and non-subordination to the executive authority, allowing it to directly exercise its powers related to market regulation and punishment of practices contrary to free competition. The Algerian legislator has granted the Competition Council a set of important powers as an independent administrative authority, enabling it to regulate the market and protect free competition. However, it shares executive authority in these matters. It cannot be said that the Competition Council is fully independent, as its members are appointed by the authority represented by the President of the Republic, especially in the absence of other appointment methods. Despite some required conditions for the President’s selection of members, they only relate to the necessary competence for performing their duties. As for functional independence, there are numerous interventions by the executive authority, particularly in establishing internal regulations. Additionally, the council’s funds are considered the Ministry of Trade’s funds, being its sole source of income. Furthermore, annual reports are submitted to other entities.