The Competition and Markets Authority: can the whole be greater than the sum of its parts?

Abstract

This article reviews the creation of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), to be formed from merging the Office of Fair Trading and Competition Commission (CC). It examines the benefits claimed by the government for the CMA but finds these ‘soft’ and not all merger-specific. Much complexity is needed to preserve good parts of the present system. The issues in antitrust, merger control, regulation, and market investigations are reviewed and the CMA’s structure and governance discussed; CMA ‘panel’ members may play a role in antitrust cases after all. The overall assessment is not wholly unfavourable. Much will depend on how those running the new CMA exercise their considerable discretion. A major concern is to retain existing OFT and CC staff and CC members. Various measures of success are offered (necessarily ‘soft’ like the targets); the article concludes that the CMA will be judged (stringently in view of the great benefits claimed by the government) by whether it: operates the market investigation regime, including remedies, well; improves antitrust decision-making; justifies itself on appeal; keeps the current high international reputation enjoyed by the CC/OFT; and retains the existing high-quality staff.