The Common Notion of Free Will

Abstract

A number of studies within the domain of neuroscience have shown that conscious awareness of the decision to perform an action is preceded by unconscious activity in the brain. This in turn is taken to indicate that unconscious brain activity is the cause of action and not conscious willing. In this chapter, I assess arguments that unconscious brain activity is a threat to the common notion of free will. I dispute the idea that the common view of free will requires conscious willing. Additionally, I argue for the claim that unconscious processes play a role in the formation of conscious volitions. Based on that, I argue against the view that volition must be conscious. In this chapter, I also tackle the purported incompatibility between free will and scientific determinism. After assessing calls for the elimination of the commonsense concept of free will, I conclude that the incompatibility between the two notions rests on an unfavorable characterization of commonsense free will. I further argue that any concept of free will requires endorsement of a particular background theory and because of that I question whether any such concept can be properly characterized as common sense.