Abstract
This article considers some salient theoretical contributions which bear upon our understanding of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU). It outlines the fundamental dilemma highlighted in game theory known as ‘the tragedy of the commons’ and goes on to examine whether the CFP can be construed as a ‘policy fiasco’. The article considers how the fisheries of the EU could be more effectively managed and underlines the urgent need for international collective action. With the mismatch between the CFP and the scale of the problem it is intended to address firmly in sight, the article concludes with an evaluation and some policy suggestions.
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