Abstract
In his recent book [2] J. R. Searle attempts to develop a general theory of the way in which we commit ourselves by performing the various types of speech-acts. In addition to its intrinsic importance, this general theory is also utilized in an attempt to provide a definitive reply to the many critics of his alleged derivation of an 'ought from an 'is' [3]. My contention will be that a subtle defect in the general theory vitiates Searle's reply to the objections. When the defect is remedied justice can be done to the undoubtedly important truths which Searle's account misrepresents. Searle selects the speech-act of promising as his central example. The doctrine concerning commitment which I wish to contest is conveniently summarized by Searle on pp. 186-7:
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