The Cognitive Order of Society: Radicalizing the Ontological Turn in Critical Theory

Abstract

Investigating Habermas’s radicalization of the ontological turn in the philosophy of language that eventuated in his universal or formal pragmatics, this article finds that he has not pursued his avowed radicalization far enough. By contrast with his claim that due to its conceptual thrust his type of formal pragmatics is required over and above the empiricist approach to sharpen social analysis, it emerges that his three world-concepts are social-theoretically underspecified. The direction in which the proposed radicalization beyond Habermas is pursued is determined by the core assumption that the ontological properties at issue are of a cognitive nature. The central argument is therefore that the ontological turn in Critical Theory represented by Habermas needs to be cognitive-sociologically radicalized, the result of which is the introduction of the concept of the cognitive order of society. The unique ontological status of the cognitive order thus also needs explication. Finally, that the lack of this concept systematically leaves a conspicuous theoretical gap in contemporary Critical Theory is briefly indicated with reference to some recent key publications by Honneth and Forst and Günther.