The Cognitive Bases of the Problem of Evil

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe problem of evil is a central issue in philosophy of religion, for countless believers and skeptics alike. The attempt to resolve dilemma of positing existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, creator while recognizing presence of evil in world has engaged philosophers and theologians for millennia. This article will not seek to resolve dilemma but rather to explore question of why there is a problem of evil. That is, why is it that gods are conceived in ways that give rise to this dilemma? The topic will be approached using insights into religious mind being developed by disciplines contributing to Cognitive Science of Religion. The thesis to be developed is that this problem is a product of natural cognitive processes that give rise to god-beliefs, beliefs that are shaped by evolved moral intuitions.For there are gods, and knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as multitude believe. . . . For utterances of multitude about gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that greatest evils happen to wicked and greatest blessings happen to good from hand of gods.-EpicurusLetter to MenoeceusI. IntroductionWhile not more famous saying attributed to Epicurus on gods, this passage makes two important claims relevant to religion: 1) that belief in existence of gods, or supernatural agents in general, is manifest to, or comes naturally to, humans, and 2) that these supernatural agents are readily assumed to be morally interested beings who distribute rewards and punishments, accordingly. Belief in supernatural agency, whether in form of gods, spirits, revered ancestors, ghosts, demons, etc., is found in every culture and in every period for which we have evidence. It is, as Scott Atran puts it, the most culturally recurrent, cognitively relevant, and evolutionarily compelling concept in (Atran 2002, 57); and these supernatural agents are regularly understood to behave in ways that are significant for human welfare. Leaving aside question of existence of such agents, which Epicurus affirms, or accuracy of this common moral assumption, which Epicurus rejects, question that concerns us here, and which was of great concern to Epicurus, is why humans so readily interpret their gods in morally-relevant ways. Why did rumbling of earth or thundering of sky drive our ancestors to devise rituals of appeasement? Why did Agamemnon believe that only his daughter's death could sate Artemis's anger? And why would Abraham so readily accept that any god could demand a child as a burnt offering? A significant achievement of several disciplines that contribute to cognitive science of religion (CSR) is development of a cognitive model that explains both origin and ubiquity of god-beliefs, and this model can shed light on moral assumptions about gods and their responsibility for evil. Drawing on findings of this field, I will argue that problem of evil is generated by cognitive processes that give rise to god-beliefs, as those beliefs are informed by evolved-moral intuitions. The 'problem' arises independent of doctrinal or theological teachings-its origin derives from natural workings of our evolved social-brain. Before proceeding we first must clarify what I mean by morally-relevant.In thinking about morality and gods it would be inappropriate and inaccurate to use monotheistic traditions as default model. In these traditions there is an intimate connection between nature of God and morality, but this understanding of gods is a relatively late and theologically sophisticated development. It would be just as much a mistake, however, to assume that gods of older, polytheistic traditions were not morally significant. It is true that not all gods were viewed as moral role models, or even as interested in moral behavior of humans. …