Abstract
For each (individually rational) payoff configuration of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating payoff configurations that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation—which we label outsider independent—is employed.
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