The Clinton administration's policy toward Angola: an assessment

Abstract

This article assesses President Bill Clinton's foreign policy towards Angola within the context of United States’ post‐World War II foreign policy, Clinton's overall foreign policy, and his approach towards sub‐Saharan Africa. In September, 1992, multi‐party elections based on national reconciliation were held in Angola. After losing those elections to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) Jonas Savimbi and his National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) returned to warfare, quickly gaining control of over 70 per cent of the country. The Bush administration responded to Savimbi's actions by proposing a new round of negotiations based on ‘power sharing’, designed to give Savimbi and UNITA another chance to gain state power. President Clinton extended diplomatic relations to the Government of Angola, but also promoted the power sharing solution. In 1984 an agreement was made between the Government and UNITA, which led to a government of national unity in 1997. Savimbi, however, continued to terrorise the Angolan society. Two central questions raised in this assessment are: 1) Why was Savimbi able to sustain his military option? and 2) Was the Clinton administration actually committed to ‘national reconciliation’ in Angola? The current analysis shows that: 1) Savimbi sustained his military option because UNITA earned over $3 billion smuggling diamonds, enabling him to purchase ample supplies of weapons; and 2) as long as Western business interests made profits there, the instability wrought by Savimbi was acceptable to the hegemonic interests of the United States.