The Climate Debate Held Hostage by the G2

Abstract

Real optimism lies in saying that the next 25,000 years will be very difficult. - Romain GaryA year after the Copenhagen Summit, the Cancun Conference (29 November-11 December 2010) showed that, despite some progress, nothing decisive will happen in facing up to change without the engagement of the United States as well as the Peo- ple's Republic of China. In the arena, as in so many others, the G2 has in fact emerged as a global axis, and countless difficulties that punc- tuated attempts to draw up an indispensable post-Kyoto regime from Bali (December 2007) to Tianjin (October 2010) can be seen as so many signs of the general reconfiguration of the post-Cold War international sys- tem - a reconfiguration taking neither the form of unipolarity centred on American hyperpower (dreaded by some) nor of multipolarity (hoped for by others), but rather of Washington-Beijing bipolarity. Of course, the Eu- ropean Union (27-strong) accounts for a quarter of the world's GDP and must play a major role in drawing up a more equitable international order. Unfortunately, divergences among its members on climate, currency, de- fence, and the trans-Atlantic link, among others, keep it from converting its unique institutional structure into political will. As Chris Patten wrote in 2010, Europe is not and will not become a superpower or superstate. Un- like the US we do not matter everywhere. (1)China, on the other hand, has been making its voice heard and extending its influence widely on the international scene. Middle Kingdom is now an indispensable supplier of funds to the United States and to many Third World countries, as well as to Greece and even Portugal. It is no longer the workshop of the world, as it had been dubbed only recently. It has emerged as a development model admired by many governments in the global south. This ascent is illustrated by the fact that some people are now talk- ing about an emerging Beijing Consensus to supplant the now defunct Washington Consensus.This rearrangement of the global chessboard is not without implications for the climate question, which is becoming more serious even as its res- olution is getting complicated. This double effect appears clearly as much in the analysis of historic and prospective links between the economic evo- lution of the G2 members and their greenhouse gas emissions as in the ex- amination of possible solutions leading to a new regime.G2 and CO2In July 2009, during the first US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington, President Barack Obama declared, The relationship be- tween the United States and China will shape the twenty-first century. Of course, all political talk has a performative focus. All the same, the least that can be said about this quote is that it is confirmed by all available in- dicators, be they measures of economic might or (present and future) re- sponsibility for change.The world's top two economies (in PPP terms)Calculated in purchasing power parities (PPP) terms,(2) the US and Chi- nese gross domestic products are the world's two highest. Measured against current exchange rates, China inevitably recedes to third place be- hind Japan, but it is nevertheless ahead of Germany, France, and Britain. (3)This position caps three decades of sustained, exceptional economic growth following the Deng Xiaoping-initiated shift towards capitalism in 1978, further consolidated through stepped-up liberalisation (and open- ing) of the economy after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre(4) (symbolised by Deng's southern tour of 1992). Thus, between 1980 and 2008, that is, in a little over a quarter of a century, the Chinese GDP (PRC and Hong Kong in current exchange rates) leapt from $243.1 billion (2000) to $2,843.9 bil- lion, a nearly 12-fold rise, or a 9.2 percent growth rate. Meanwhile (using the same calculations), the GDP of the United States rose from $5,142. …