The Classical Roots of Hume's Skepticism

Abstract

In recent years, while controversy over the role of skepticism in Hume's philosophy has intensified,' scholarly inquiry into ancient skepticism has also increased.2 Efforts at comparisons between skepticisms, old and new, with Sextus Empiricus and David Hume as paradigms, seem inevitable. Yet, in such discussions, though many have noticed the discrepancies between their accounts of the differences between the Pyrrhonians and the Academicians, few have noted what the differences are, and fewer yet have labored at discerning what the reasons for these differences might be.3 David Fate Norton concludes his excellent summary of Pyrrhonian skepticism with the remark, It is difficult to reconcile this account of Pyrrhonism with Hume's views on the topic. He then opines, One cannot say with certainty how Hume came to this distorted view of Pyrrhonism..., though he himself gives some suggestions worthy of consideration.4 While I think he is right that such certainty is beyond our grasp, I think we can do a fuller job of exposing the differences, exploring the historical antecedents and examining the conceptual divergencies. On