The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Experience (I)

Abstract

The common question class action has been a source of division and controversy in the legal community. Hailed by its proponents as both a means for small claimants to obtain redress and a deterrent to corporate wrongdoing, the class action has been attacked by others as tantamount to “legalized blackmail” and as threatening to swamp the already overburdened judicial system with proceedings of extraordinary complexity. Two empirical studies of the class action have also reached diametrically opposed conclusions. A study by the American College of Trial Lawyers found that the common question class action suit “has mandated heavy expenditures of judicial time, effort and expense” and has sacrificed “procedural and substantive fairness to the party opposing the class,” while a study commissioned by the Senate Commerce Committee found that most class actions “proceed with reasonable smoothness in the Federal court.” Proposals to restrict the use of class actions have been advanced. While these proposals have not been adopted, the courts have increasingly limited the circumstances under which class actions may be maintained.