The clash of great powers and revolution in the Baltic Sea?

Abstract

The Soviet party leadership claimed repeatedly after the mid-1920s that the Soviet Union was under an acute threat of intervention. The interpretation was based on different views regarding the development of socialism in the USSR. The role of Finland in the Soviet policy towards other border-states offers a case for observing the relation of ideology and practice in Soviet foreign policy, especially in the Baltic Sea context in 1925. The main interests for the Soviets were plans for military alliances and spheres of influence and intelligence. Contrary to the ideological worldview, the Peoples’ Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) did not see the western great powers, Great Britain and France, as being behind the Baltic alliance plan. Instead, the alliance attempt was primarily seen as an independent Polish initiative, especially lacking British support. The Soviet foreign administration was able to evaluate the grounds for eventual Finnish non-alliance accurately, despite Baltic sympathies and the lack of an active Scandinavian orientation. The results suggest the NKID observed international relations from the traditional viewpoint of Soviet state interests, and on the basis of quite accurate information, not reflecting the needs of ideological interpretation or domestic power struggles.