The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games.

Abstract

The term procedural frames is introduced and defined as different representations of structurally equivalent allocation processes. Study 1 compared 2 well-known games, sequential social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining, that share the same structure: Player 1 creates an allocation of a resource and Player 2 decides whether to allow it or deny it. Study 1 found that Player 1 made more favorable allocations and Player 2 accepted more unfavorable allocations in a social dilemma frame than in an equivalent ultimatum bargaining frame. Study 2 revealed the critical deterininant was whether Player 2 had to respond to an allocation by accepting or rejecting it (as in the ultimatum game) or by making a claim (as in the social dilemma). Two additional studies explored how these actions are perceived. The inconsistency of behavior across procedural frames raises methodological concerns but illuminates construal processes that guide allocation. Two of the most-studied paradigms in mixed-motive research have been social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining games (Komorita & Parks, 1995). These allocation procedures differ substantially in how the actions of participants are described. In ultimatum bargaining games, players propose a division of a common resource and accept or reject the proposal; in social dilemmas, players make a claim from a common resource. However, versions of these games have been developed that are structurally equivalent but that appear to induce different rates of cooperation. Players appear to be more generous in sequential social dilemmas than in ultimatum bargaining games. The following research tests the existence of the social dilemma-ultimatu m bargaining framing effect. The findings offer insight into a specific bias in bargaining, which we call the claiming effect, as well as the more general role that the subjective interpretation of action plays in allocation decisions.