The Civilian Side of Military Culture

Abstract

The current interaction between reformers (agenda pushers to their antagonists) and the professional military is part of a long history of tension between society and the armed forces. As Samuel Huntington famously argued, this tension becomes especially intense in periods of transition from war to something else, as in today's ongoing adjustment to the end of the Cold War. Where will the pressures toward transmutation end? [1] The answer lies with the American society and its attitudes and expectations of the military, with what can usefully, if awkwardly, be termed civilian military The purpose of this article is to attempt answers to a number of questions about our military culture. To begin with, what are its core characteristics? Second, what are its origins? Third, are attitudes about the military presently undergoing change, or merely the appearance of change? And finally, how might the military most prudently respond to cultural pressures from America? Core Attributes In the works of historians, political scientists, and sociologists, a rough consensus exists on three core attributes of military culture. Americans are typically impatient about combat, sensitive to US casualties, and skeptical of the military's right to be different. [2] Impatience about combat is suggested by the experience of Americans in war. Only two of our wars lasted longer than five years. The Revolutionary War (1775-1783) was one of them, and it sorely tested the endurance of the population. The social safety valve of Loyalist escape to Canada and an often-casual attitude toward militia obligations relieved what might otherwise have been unbearable pressure on the government to win the war quickly or acknowledge defeat. To a remarkable degree, the perseverance of a single man, General George Washington, allowed the war to continue until it was won. The only other American experience with large-scale, sustained combat was in Vietnam (1964-1973). In that war, the crossover point in American public opinion was the Tet Offensive of 1968. Tet was a catalyst of opinion change for a number of reasons. One of them was that it gave the lie to administration and Pentagon assurances that victory was near. If those who planned and conducted the US part in the war had chosen to do things differently, perhaps the public might have supported a longer war. We will never know. What we do know, though, is that American support for the war declined as US casualties mounted. In fact, the Vietnam experience was remarkably similar in this respect to the Korean War. [3] American sensitivity to US casualties has been a feature of even our most major wars. World War I is instructive. When the United States entered the war, the British, Germans, and Russians had already suffered horrendous casualties, numbering in the millions, and had been fighting for three years. From April 1917 through the next year, the United States lost 116,516 military personnel in the war. [4] Yet the cost was too much for the US Commander-in-Chief to bear. Woodrow Wilson, greatly troubled by the American casualties, could accept those losses only if the reality of the war could be aligned with its rhetoric. Only in wars fought on American soil have Americans demonstrated a resolve to pay any price, bear any burden. On top of impatience and sensitivity must be added skepticism. Skepticism has in fact been a key feature of US attitudes toward the military since the nation's founding. Some of the nation's most illustrious early leaders, in particular Thomas Jefferson, regretted even the necessity of a standing military force. Jefferson therefore became an early and successful exponent of transmutation. If a standing army could not be eliminated, it could at least be oriented toward useful--meaning civilian--pursuits. Hence Jefferson's use of the military for exploration and road-building, and his decision to appoint as superintendent of the US Military Academy an amateur scientist rather than a professional soldier. …