The citizen‐candidate model with imperfect policy control: Strategic delegation and polarization

R Emre Aytimur,Aristotelis Boukouras,Robert Schwager

doi:10.1111/caje.12222

Abstract

AbstractWe present a modified citizen‐candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two‐candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates' policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one‐candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.

Highlights

The recent economic crisis within the Eurozone has revealed an interesting aspect of political economics
In subsection 3.2 we illustrate the main findings in the special model with linear utility functions. In both subsections we start by analyzing equilibria with two candidates, and turn to one-candidate equilibria
We show that this extended model is structurally different from the standard model with perfect policy control by examining equilibria with one or two candidates running for office

Summary

Introduction

The recent economic crisis within the Eurozone has revealed an interesting aspect of political economics. We show that the ideal policies of two candidates running in an equilibrium, and the policies implemented in case of victory, must differ by a minimum amount This minimal distance increases in the strength of the external power and in the difference between the median voter’s and its preferred policies, but is independent of the cost of candidacy. It has been shown that ideal policies in a two-candidate equilibrium must be sufficiently far apart if the final policy is a weighted average of the ideal policies of all candidates (Hamlin and Hjortlund 2000), or if the decision to stand in the election must be taken before the distribution of voter preferences is known (Brusco and Roy 2011) Both Hamlin and Hjortlund (2000) and Brusco and Roy (2011) assume sincere voting, and the driving force behind the divergence results is the threat of a third candidate entering on the fringe of the political spectrum.

The Model

Results

Single-peaked Preferences

Linear Symmetric Utility

Conclusion