The CIS and the Caucasus

Abstract

Conclusions * Russia initially viewed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as an artificial organization. But, since 1993, elements of the Russian government have tried to use the CIS as a vehicle for the voluntary reintegration of the former Soviet republics. * Moscow is promoting the CIS as a regional peacekeeping organization, seeking recognition as a UN Chapter VIII Regional Organization, similar to the Organization of American States. * International acceptance of the CIS as a regional organization has been hampered by Russia's dominance of the organization. The CIS is seen as a cover for Moscow's imperial intentions. * International recognition of the CIS is also hampered by the fact that most of its member states are still struggling to establish their sovereignty. Until more CIS member states are viable, the international character of the organization will be questioned. * The states of the Caucasus region have different views regarding membership in a regional organization. Armenia and Georgia are favorably disposed, in prinicple, towards membership, but they have discrete reservations about their relationship with the CIS. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, anticipates its oil riches will allow it to return to its former golden days and has reservations about joining any regional organization. * All the states of the Caucasus are suspicious of Moscow's intentions towards the region. Commonwealth or Empire The Russian Federation is caught between conflicting pressures and memories: trying to construct a viable post-Communist society and government while also attempting to sort out its relations with the outside world. The importance (to the West) of a successful Russian transition to a normal, status quo power is so great that it behooves the West not to prejudge either Moscow's intentions or actions. Traditional skepticism of its's motives, and the pursuit of prejudiced policies could contribute to the failure of the transition process. One priority area for Moscow--and therefore a potential litmus test for observers--is how it deals with its neighbors, the successor states to the USSR. Many Russians want to return these neighbors--what they call the Near Abroad--to the fold. They are, however, faced both with questions of how to do so and how to define the new relationship. The other successor states naturally view Moscow's interest in reintegration with mixed interest and suspicion--as do many Western observers. A major instrument for Russian Federation policy on this question appears to be the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Moscow touts the CIS as a natural development-based on history, common interest, and mutual consent--by which many of the successor states can be reintegrated into a more or less coherent regional space. There are two aspects to this policy which merit close watching: first, the degree of success in reintegrating the region; second, the character of the institutional result. For the West, final judgment of the effort will depend upon three factors: * the degree of mutual consent by which the process is pursued; * the degree of mutual advantage shared by the participants, especially the smaller nations; * the degree to which the CIS permits politicial, economic, and social interaction with outsiders (such as the United States). The import of the CIS' development is enormous. Its evolving character will tell much about the evolving character of the new Russian Federation. The Caucasus Region provides an excellent window through which Moscow's intentions may be observed. The three Caucasian republics-Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan--share geography, historical experiences as part of the Soviet Union, the disparity of power between themselves and Russia, and a desire to maintain their newly found independence. However, their individual national interests are not the same, and their perspectives on the region's immediate neighbors (Russia, Turkey, and Iran) vary considerably. …