Abstract

From an embodied and enactive point of view, the mind–body problem has been reformulated as the relation between the lived or subject body on the one hand and the physiological or object body on the other (“body–body problem”). The aim of the paper is to explore the concept of circularity as a means of explaining the relation between the phenomenology of lived experience and the dynamics of organism–environment interactions. This concept of circularity also seems suitable for connecting enactive accounts with ecological psychology. It will be developed in a threefold way:(1) As the circular structure of embodiment, which manifests itself (a) in the homeostatic cycles between the brain and body and (b) in the sensorimotor cycles between the brain, body, and environment. This includes the interdependence of an organism’s dispositions of sense-making and the affordances of the environment.(2) As the circular causality, which characterizes the relation between parts and whole within the living organism as well as within the organism–environment system.(3) As the circularity of process and structure in development and learning. Here, it will be argued that subjective experience constitutes a process of sense-making that implies (neuro-)physiological processes so as to form modified neuronal structures, which in turn enable altered future interactions.On this basis, embodied experience may ultimately be conceived as the integration of brain–body and body–environment interactions, which has a top-down, formative, or ordering effect on physiological processes. This will serve as an approach to a solution of the body–body problem.

Highlights

  • According to enactive and ecological approaches to cognition, the mind is not to be regarded as a disembodied internal representation of the external world, nor as a system of brain modules, neural symbols, and algorithms that allow us to calculate and predict the world

  • If we re-conceptualize the disembodied mind, which is still the predominant concept of present-day Cartesian materialism (Rockwell, 2005; Knowles, 2014), the mind– body problem has to be recast. It is no longer a question of how the mind is related to the brain but how the lived or subject body on the one hand is related to the living or object body on the other; in short, it becomes the “body–body problem,” as Hanna and Thompson (2003) and Thompson (2007) have termed it

  • (3) The circularity of process and structure shapes the development of the living being over time

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Summary

Thomas Fuchs*

Phenomenological Psychopathology and Psychotherapy, Psychiatric Clinic, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany. The aim of the paper is to explore the concept of circularity as a means of explaining the relation between the phenomenology of lived experience and the dynamics of organism–environment interactions. This concept of circularity seems suitable for connecting enactive accounts with ecological psychology. It will be argued that subjective experience constitutes a process of sense-making that implies (neuro-)physiological processes so as to form modified neuronal structures, which in turn enable altered future interactions On this basis, embodied experience may be conceived as the integration of brain–body and body–environment interactions, which has a top-down, formative, or ordering effect on physiological processes.

INTRODUCTION
LIVED BODY AND LIVING BODY
Interactive Cycles of the Embodied Mind
Diachronic Circularity of Process and Structure
CONCLUSION
Full Text
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