The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History of a Disinformation Campaign

Abstract

INTRODUCTION The covert operation by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to forcibly oust Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz in June 1954 has been almost documented now, thanks to near-total declassification of operation's records. It is now clear that this event represented a decisive moment in U.S. relations with Latin America during Cold War. Not surprisingly, given significance of event (a fact perceived at time), a good number of studies have been dedicated to its analysis. Half a century later, and through study of new records, historiographic debate seems to have arrived at conclusion that in U.S. decision to overthrow Arbenz, ideological imperatives and policies demanded by global bipolar confrontation were more important than any economic motivation related to influence of banana monopoly, United Fruit Company, on governing circles in Washington. (1) It is interesting that despite abundant scholarly literature on vast CIA operation to overthrow Arbenz via a military coup, (2) there are only scarce and dispersed references by those scholars to exile of Arbenz. His exile has been treated as a painful personal drama. But on contrary, CIA documentation alerts us to how much agency continued to dedicate itself covertly to destroying public image of president after he was toppled. Arbenz was considered a political figure of first order of importance within Latin American spectrum, a fact corroborated in historiographic literature. For that reason CIA seems to have taken an immediately vigilant attitude toward Arbenz. Based on declassified documents consulted for this article, not only is it possible to determine existence of a rigorous control and surveillance of each one of former president's steps; also revealed is extent to which agency focused on targeted operations against interests of Arbenz. Sometimes these were efforts to influence, and other times to orchestrate, some of trials and tribulations, rumors, speculations, denunciations, and misinformation published by media (especially Guatemalan and Uruguayan print media) about Arbenz, his family, his friends, and his political future. It is fitting to point out that this CIA media strategy, central and specific topic of this article, was particularly intense between 1954 and 1960. With eruption of Cuban revolution Arbenz's notoriety entered a phase of some decline. After 1960 CIA records on Arbenz are scarce, and most probably, efforts of CIA were not necessary because by that time ex-president was a symbol of defeat. (3) In any case, proposal to investigate more deeply surveillance and attacks inspired by CIA mainly during first years of Arbenz's exile provides us opportunity to understand a facet heretofore unknown of CIA's methods. And no less important: case reveals how opinion may be constructed. The Arbenz affair illuminates a strategy that CIA valued positively. Indeed, one of its analysts commented, [T]he language, arguments and techniques of Arbenz episode were used in Cuba in beginning of decade of 60s, in Brazil in 1964, in Dominican Republic in 1965, and in Chile in 1973. (4) This significant affirmation confirms, as noted in much literature, that 1954 stainless (5) triumph went far beyond case of Guatemala. (6) As of this moment, new materials permit us to establish three certain principles. First, one must point out that the historian, in these years of Arbenz's life, cannot do otherwise than to simply narrate facts since he completely disappeared from history of his country after his resignation. (7) Second, it is necessary to realize that we are beholding an event as painful as it has been silenced in Guatemalan history. …