Abstract

Consider individuals facing an uncertain lifetime (and hence uncertain future income). Each individual must go through (identical) medical checkups. The choice of a medical expert who interprets the results, and hence provides more information about the random lifetime, must be made before the checkup. We show that, in the absence of a life insurance market, a better medical expert is preferred by all individuals. However, when a life insurance market exists, and the medical checkup is carried out before purchasing a life insurance policy, some individuals may choose the inferior medical expert even though the checkup has not yet taken place.

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