Abstract

The authors explore a commercial security policy (the Chinese Wall) which represents the behavior required of those persons who perform corporate analysis for financial institutions. It can be distinguished from Bell-LaPadula-like policies by the way that a user's permitted accesses are constrained by the history of his previous accesses. It is shown that the formal representation of the policy correctly permits a market analyst to talk to any corporation which does not create a conflict of interest with previous assignments. The Chinese Wall policy combines commercial discretion with legally enforceable mandatory controls. It is required in the operation of many financial services organizations; the authors conclude that it is, therefore, perhaps as significant to the financial world as Bell-LaPadula's policies are to the military.< <ETX xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">&gt;</ETX>

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.