Abstract
This paper analyzes the reformed model of the Chinese enterprise, defined as the combination of the contract management system, the managerial responsibility system, and the internal contract system. Alternative models of the reform-output relationship, allowing (1) Hicks-neutral, disembodied effects; (2) embodied, incentive-based effects; and (3) firm characteristics interaction effects, are investigated. The isolated effect on output of any single reform measure is not significant, but the effects of some combinations of them are significant, but small, when we control for original firm performance.
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