The Chinese (Broken) U‑shaped Line in the South China Sea: Points, Lines, and Zones

Abstract

Introduction Since the emergence of international law in relation to land, air(space), and sea, points (or dots, dian), lines (xian), and zones (or planes, mian or qu), both real and imagined, have become of vital importance. The relation of points, lines, and zones is governed by the laws of geometry: two connected points make one line, at least two points are needed to draw a line, and a minimum of one line is required to form a zone. In legal maritime parlance, points can be labelled basepoints or trijunction points (among other things). The description of lines is quite complex, ranging from the general: baselines, straight lines, agreed closing lines, (1) and thalweg lines (imaginary lines along the deepest part of the main channel of, for example, a river); to the specific: for example, the Green Line separating East and West Beirut in Lebanon, or the Mogadishu Line (in existence since early 1993), or the Attila Line dividing the Turkish Cypriot Zone in the north of Cyprus Island from the southern Greek Cypriot Zone, or the unilateral North Limit Line between North and South Koreas, or the Line of Control in disputed Kashmir (between India and Pakistan). Lines can also become maritime zones of one kind or another: the coastal zone, for example, which is not defined in the April 1982 United Nations Third Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter 1982 Law of the Sea) and which suggests that the 1982 Law of the Sea has ambiguities and legal loopholes. This article focuses on the Chinese (broken) U-shaped line. This line is the traditional Chinese maritime boundary in the South China Sea (SCS), the fifth largest body of water on earth, and it intersects waters off four Southeast Asian countries. The first section discusses the positive and negative aspects of this line, while considering some other points of interest that are more ambivalent. The second section examines the relationship between the U-shaped line and other maritime concepts. It should be noted at the outset that this author is of the view that, due to the lack of an effective form of world government, which could enforce international law and punish culprits, politics of one kind or another dominates in the international arena. War may also follow political struggle. Many experts in international law concede that political will, among other things, is necessary to resolve legal disputes at sea, especially in view of the fact that there has been no consistent pattern of human behaviour in this area. It can, therefore, be argued that it is generally brute (political and/or military) force, not international law, which determines the fate of points, lines, and zones at sea; and that this will be the case for at least the next few decades. (2) A good example of this is what is happening to Huangyan Dao (also known as Democracy or Scarborough Island), which is part of the Zhongsha Island Group (Macclesfield Bank). (3) Until recently, the fate of this island has been immaterial to most Chinese and foreign experts, because (as Chiu Hungdah observes) the Zhongsha is submerged and, therefore, according to international law, both Taiwan and mainland China cannot say that they possess it. (4) Nevertheless, in what can be described as an act of gerrymandering, Beijing has laid claim to Huangyan Dao, incorporating it as part of the Zhongsha Island Group. This act can, from the Chinese point of view, be compared with the appropriation of Hawaii by the United States. The example of Huangyan Dao, must, however, be seen in the context of the Chinese (broken) U-shaped line, which will be discussed in detail below. The U-shaped Line I shall begin by discussing the genesis (5) of the U-shaped line, which was first delineated by Hu Jinjie, a Chinese cartographer, in December 1914, after the Republic of China's recovery, in October 1909 (according to the Chinese lunar calendar), of the Dongsha (or Pratas) Island Group from Imperial Japan. …