The Chinese Army's Role in the Cultural Revolution

Abstract

F ALL THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS which China's Cultural Revolution has provoked, those raised by role of People's Liberation Army (PLA) in this political upheaval are perhaps most tantalizing and enigmatic. On one hand, there have been indications of dissent within PLA of more serious proportions than at any time since dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai in I959. Bourgeois military thinking and other mistaken attitudes have once again come under attack in military press. Lo Jui-ch'ing, PLA Chief of Staff since I959 when he replaced P'eng's colleague Huang K'o-ch'eng, and hitherto regarded as politically beyond reproach, disappeared from sight at start of Cultural Revolution. It was later revealed that a big struggle had taken place in PLA, in course of which party uncovered representatives of bourgeoisie who had usurped important posts in and who vainly attempted substitute a bourgeois military line for Chairman Tse-tung's proletarian military line.' All these signs of disaffection might easily point to conclusion, voiced by one leading Western analyst, that the showdown between political and military leaders is imminent, if indeed it has not already taken place. Yet a totally opposite trend was also visible in relationship of PLA to Cultural Revolution. There was public elevation of Minister of Defence Lin Piao in summer of i966 to a position second only to himself in party leadership. It was Lin and no one else who was styled Mao's close comrade-in-arms (a New China News Agency report which described Lin as plain comrade was hastily withdrawn and corrected). It was Lin who set pace in campaign to study Mao's thought (Mao-study) and who gave key speeches at mass meetings of Red Guards. Only Lin was described as man who has resolutely stood at side of Chairman Mao throughout Chinese revolution. When Chairman appeared at a Red Guard rally wearing PLA's olive-green uniform complete with red-starred cap, army news-