The China fallacy: How the US can benefit from China's rise and avoid another Cold War by Donald Gross

Abstract

Donald Gross The fallacy: How the can benefit from China's rise and avoid another Cold War New York: Bloomsbury, 2012. 320pp., $120.00 (cloth) ISBN 978-1441 100832Whether to wield the stick against adversaries or feed them carrots: that is one of the perennial debates in Washington, DC. The debate has at its heart the belief that American actions are one of the primary factors determining the behaviour of other states. When the runs up against a state whose core goals do not appear susceptible to change under the pressure of threats or enticement of rewards, the policy debate is liable to oscillate between extreme conciliation and extreme firmness. Desperately seeking to demonstrate that influence can be decisive, policy proponents are prone to make unlikely promises about the favourable outcomes that will result from their chosen course of action.Such an unlikely promise lies at the heart of Donald Gross's book The Fallacy, which is otherwise an able overview of the state of Sino-American relations and a useful corrective to an American policy debate on that he contends is far narrower than it ought to be (37). Gross contends that the debate is dominated by China hawks who have succeeded in defining as a threat to both the security and economy of the United States, when in reality much of China's military build-up and internal repression can be attributed to its own perception of a US threat. It follows that, by reducing China's perception of this threat, its policy can be altered.Gross argues that by reducing tension with and ultimately arriving at a framework agreement, the groundwork will be laid for the mutual strengthening of the Chinese and American economies, the political liberalization of China, and an enduring Sino-American peace that extinguishes the spectre of nuclear war between the two countries. The central plank of the proposed agreement is for the United States to follow a policy of strategic in the Asia-Pacific and to reduce its military forces and movements in the region in exchange for formally renouncing the use of force against Taiwan and agreeing to submit its maritime disputes to international arbitration (44). would exercise its own restraint by sharply de-escalating tensions in the Taiwan Straits and increasing military transparency, among other more minor measures.Equally wide-ranging initiatives in the economic and political realms would see included in a Trans Pacific Partnership free trade agreement and agreement reached on a basket of political principles modelled on the Helsinki Final Act reached between the and the Soviet Union in 1975. Among the principles to be enshrined would be a commitment by to the unrestricted dissemination of information, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, free exchange of peoples, and open borders, along with mutual commitments to sovereign equality, territorial integrity of states and non-intervention in internal affairs (122-123).A lawyer and diplomat by background, Gross places great faith in the ability of the leaders of the and to negotiate mutually agreeable solutions to issues that arise between them by employing 'win-win' thinking (152). This often gives the book an unfortunate appearance of focusing overly on diplomatic process while not analyzing in sufficient depth either the goals of China's leadership or the country's historical inheritance. …