Abstract

The proclamation of the Charter for Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in December 2000 at Nice, France, followed by its inclusion within the failed Constitutional Treaty and its current status as a legally binding document under the Treaty of Lisbon, charts the changing fortunes of European Union politics dealing with fundamental rights protection. This article outlines the main rationales and hopes behind the enactment of the Charter and notes that through the process of political conditionality it may have been devalued from its very conception. The article suggests that, following their accession, Poland, and later the Czech Republic, used the Charter and Lisbon Treaty negotiations, including their opt-outs from the Charter, to engage in a game of power politics that had both domestic and European undertones. This politics of power game-play reflected a need by both states, and Poland in particular, to respond to both the political conditionality that they had been required to sign up to as part of the accession process and to emphasise how membership had improved their negotiating power. The article suggests that the consequence of this action by both states has not only further devalued the Charter but potentially undermined the rights of Polish and Czech citizens.

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