Abstract
This article empirically tests competing explanations for intergenerational policy differences using a cross section of generational accounts from Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999). Generational imbalance rises when a public transfer program is created that benefits living generations and harms future generations. Generational imbalance is greatest in countries with a large elderly population, high income growth rate, greater income Inequality, and dispersed political parties. The results are consistent with successful rent seeking by the elderly and poor, and suggest that countries with a high income growth rate and coalition government are less able to resist intergenerational redistribution.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
