The Changing Value of Seniority in the U.S. House: Conditional Party Government Revised

Andrew B Hall,Kenneth A Shepsle

doi:10.1017/s0022381613001102

Abstract

In this article, we argue that institutional changes to the seniority system have electoral consequences to incumbents. Building on the theory of Conditional Party Government, we argue that the consolidation of power in the hands of party leadership reduces the electoral value of seniority. This reduction occurs because power that was previously in the hands of committee chairs, whose roles are obtained through seniority, is ceded to party leaders. By increasing the party’s brand, this centralization also delivers a dividend received by all members regardless of seniority. We present empirical evidence supporting this argument. Our findings suggest that the “condition” of Conditional Party Government, i.e., preference homogeneity among the majority party, is only a necessary condition; in order for centralization to occur, party reformers must also overcome the opposition of entrenched senior members.

Highlights

The “condition” part of conditional party government (CPG) theory is the degree of homogeneity of policy preferences among members of the majority party and, a frequent accompaniment, the degree of polarization between it and the opposition.2 When the majority party coheres around policy, its members “grease the skids” for the prosecution of the party’s policy agenda by delegating agenda-setting authority and other powers and resources to their party leaders
That is, “there is a relationship between chamber CPG and the internal organization of the chamber” (Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde, 2002: 32) or, more concretely, “the greater the degree to which the condition [preference homogeneity within and preference divergence between legislative parties] is met, the more likely that members of a party choose to provide their legislative party institutions and party leadership with stronger powers and greater resources” (Aldrich, Rohde, and Tofias, 2007: 103)
We exploit the reforms of the 1970s in the House of Representatives which, we argue, partition the postwar period into the “Weak Party Era” (19461976) and the “Strong Party Era” (1977-present)

Summary

Introduction

The “condition” part of CPG theory is the degree of homogeneity of policy preferences among members of the majority party and, a frequent accompaniment, the degree of polarization between it and the opposition. When the majority party coheres around policy, its members “grease the skids” for the prosecution of the party’s policy agenda by delegating agenda-setting authority and other powers and resources to their party leaders. While there is a clear upside for majority-party members in a strong-party era from facilitating the prosecution of their party’s agenda, the costs of strengthening party institutions are unevenly borne by its members, afflicting senior members more significantly than junior members. This is our novel revision of CPG theory, and it, too, is revealed quite clearly in our empirical analysis. This diminishing advantage of seniority in strong-party eras relative to weak-party eras is exclusively a majorityparty affair. No such tax on political capital (seniority) is exacted from members of the minority party

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Conclusion