The changing role of Naval forces: The Russian view of the 1991 Persian Gulf War

Abstract

Abstract : This report reviews Soviet commentary during the various stages of coalition military and maritime operations in the Persian Gulf. It then turns to the early analyses of the war and then finally subsequent more in-depth analyses. An overall assessment is then offered. The shift to a new defensive doctrine and the lessons of the Persian Gulf war have been reasons for the Soviet and now Russian navy to once again make a case for an increased role. Operation DESERT SHIELD demonstrated to the West that the Soviet Union did not view its own security from the sole perspective of military preparedness. The Persian Gulf war is not simply an episode but rather the model upon which future doctrine and organizational development will be built. The forces of choice for future Russian defensive missions will be the type of forces that the coalition successfully used in Operation DESERT STORM. The initial period of war will offer Russia the opportunity to contain crises without having to mobilize its full military potential. The role of the navy and air forces in certain theaters of strategic military operations will increase relative to that of the Russian ground forces. Perhaps the most significant lesson of the Soviet and Russian views on the Persian Gulf war is to once again remind us that their open-source discussions must be seen in the context of the larger debates that are ongoing. Russia, Military strategy, Desert Storm, USSR, Persian Gulf War, Navy, Desert Shield.