Abstract

It is widely recognized that Frege's systematic conception of science has a major impact on his work. I argue that central to this conception and its impact is Frege's Simplicity Requirement that a scientific system must have as few primitive truths as possible. Frege states this requirement often, justifies it in several ways, and appeals to it to motivate important aspects of his broader views. Acknowledging its central role illuminates several aspects of his work in new ways, including his treatment of truth values, logical concepts, and the dependence relations that induce a ‘natural order’ of truths.

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