The CBW Non-Proliferation Regime

Abstract

As the sciences of chemistry and biology developed in the twentieth century the international community, as noted in the first chapter, agreed a series of arms control and disarmament treaties aimed at restricting the use of such weapons. However, they made a far from easy or rapid progress and, as the recent use of nerve agent in Syria demonstrates, is not yet successfully concluded.1 Debate continues over why the US President called the use of such chemical weapons a ‘red line’ that should not be crossed. One reason is that such use opens up the possibility that these weapons, rather than being off limits, become an acceptable method of warfare. Then, all manner of novel weapons involving the misuse of the sciences of chemistry and biology could quickly be developed and used as the non-proliferation regime eroded.2 The 1925 Geneva Protocol may be a very simple document by modern standards but, as shown in the first chapter, it does clearly state this principle of non-use and has become widely accepted as a customary international law binding on all states.