Abstract
Mental causation is vitally important to the integrated information theory (IIT), which says consciousness exists since it is causally efficacious. While it might not be directly apparent, metaphysical commitments have consequential entailments concerning the causal efficacy of consciousness. Commitments regarding the ontology of consciousness and the nature of causation determine which problem(s) a view of consciousness faces with respect to mental causation. Analysis of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind has brought several problems to the fore: the alleged lack of psychophysical laws, the causal exclusion problem, and the causal pairing problem. This article surveys the threat each problem poses to IIT based on the different metaphysical commitments IIT theorists might make. Distinctions are made between what I call reductive IIT, non-reductive IIT, and non-physicalist IIT, each of which make differing metaphysical commitments regarding the ontology of consciousness and nature of causation. Subsequently, each problem pertaining to mental causation is presented and its threat, or lack thereof, to each version of IIT is considered. While the lack of psychophysical laws appears unthreatening for all versions, reductive IIT and non-reductive IIT are seriously threatened by the exclusion problem, and it is difficult to see how they could overcome it while maintaining a commitment to the causal closure principle. Yet, non-physicalist IIT denies the principle but is therefore threatened by the pairing problem, to which I have elsewhere provided a response that is briefly outlined here. This problem also threatens non-reductive IIT, but unlike non-physicalist IIT it lacks an evident response. The ultimate aim of this survey is to provide a roadmap for IIT theorists through the maze of mental causation, by clarifying which commitments lead to which problems, and how they might or might not be overcome. Such a survey can aid IIT theorists as they further develop and hone the metaphysical commitments of IIT.
Highlights
The causal efficacy of consciousness is vital to the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness
I have surveyed three paramount problems regarding mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind and how each problem might threaten the causal efficacy of consciousness on IIT
After outlining possible versions of IIT consisting of different metaphysical commitments, I explicated the three problems and the threat each poses
Summary
The causal efficacy of consciousness is vital to the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. Given this criterion for existence, if consciousness is devoid of causal power, it does not exist. Such a consequence contradicts IIT’s first axiom:. The aim of this article is not to clarify which commitments IIT theorists should make, which is something IIT theorists themselves must evaluate Rather, it provides a map of the mental causation landscape in the philosophy of the mind. The aim is to help clarify which philosophical commitments IIT theorists might make, and which mental causation problems will correspondingly arise, and how they might or might not be overcome. While IIT is often discussed in conversations regarding nonhuman consciousness, my focus here is human consciousness
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