The Catering Effect of Green Mergers and Acquisitions in Heavy Pollution Industries

Abstract

ABSTRACT We examine the motivation for green mergers and acquisitions (green M&As) in heavily polluting firms by considering the relationship between investors’ green M&A preferences and managerial decisions. Using data on green M&As conducted by heavily polluting firms in China for the 2008–2019 period, we construct an index of investors’ green M&A preferences, and find that when investors give a higher (lower) premium to green M&As, heavily polluting firms prefer to implement (avoid) green M&As. The relationship is time-varying, consistent with the catering effect. Simultaneously, when compared with non-SOEs, SOEs have a stronger green M&A catering effect. Finally, we find that managers can use investor preference as a substitute for media supervision to promote green M&A of heavily polluting firms.