The Categorial Satisfaction of Self-Reflexive Reason

Abstract

Robert Pippin's book, Hegel's Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness, is a deep, probing reconstruction of Hegel's project and the specific ways in which he tried to work out that project. It is rich in both analytical detail and in setting Hegel's thought in the historical complex of ideas that run from Kant to Fichte. It offers us a different view of Hegel than we have been accustomed to getting.I shall not concentrate too much on the details of Pippin's book, which excels in the depth and fine grained quality of its analyses. Instead, I shall deal with his overall interpretation and how good a case can be made for it. Pippin's goal of locating Hegel in terms of the Kantian project is well founded, and I think that he almost succeeds admirably. But only almost.The design of this commentary is threefold. First, I will give an overview of the general thrust of Pippin's interpretation. Second, I shall raise some questions about it and propose an alternative to it. Finally, I shall look at part of one particular section of Pippin's work, namely, his interpretation of Hegel's conception of “Essence” in the Science of Logic.Pippin's main thesis about Hegel's program seems relatively straightforward: Hegel's work should be understood as carrying on and transforming the Kantian idea of deriving all the conditions of knowledge from the transcendental unity of apperception, a special kind of self-conscious awareness of objects. Let us call this the Apperception Thesis.