Abstract
In this paper we show that response facilitation in choice reaction tasks achieved by priming the (previously perceived) effect is based on stimulus-response associations rather than on response-effect associations. The reduced key-press response time is not accounted for by earlier established couplings between the key-press movement and its subsequent effect, but instead results from couplings between this effect and the contingent key-release movement. This key-release movement is an intrinsic part of the entire performed response action in each trial of a reaction-time task, and always spontaneously follows the key-press movement. Eliminating the key-release movement from the task leads to the disappearance of the response facilitation, which raises the question whether response-effect associations actually play a role in studies that use the effect-priming paradigm. Together the three experiments presented in the paper cast serious doubts on the claim that action-effect couplings are acquired and utilized by the cognitive system in the service of action selection, and that the priming paradigm by itself can provide convincing evidence for this claim. As a corollary, we question whether the related two-step model for the ideomotor principle holds a satisfying explanation for how anticipation of future states guides action planning. The results presented here may have profound implications for priming studies in other disciplines of psychology as well.
Highlights
William James’ ideomotor principle suggests that anticipation of the consequences of movements is an important, if not essential, feature of action control [1]
This revealed a significant effect for both Response time (RT) (RTICC = 0.032, SE = 0.011, z = 2.82, Pr(.z) = 0.005) and key press. Response (Key) contact duration (KCD) (KCDIC-C = 0.036, SE = 0.011, z = 3.15, Pr(.z) = 0.002; Note that we round to three digits when reporting the small difference score estimates due to the log scale.)
The estimated Compatibility Effect (CE) obtained from the previously reported simultaneous test of trial compatibility in the linear effects model fitted to the data of Experiment 1 were used as critical values to the CEs predicted by the model fitted to the data of experiment 2
Summary
William James’ ideomotor principle suggests that anticipation of the consequences of movements is an important, if not essential, feature of action control [1]. Several studies on the development of means-end behavior and memory and retention, such as for instance the famous ‘mobile’ conditioning paradigm by Rovee-Collier and coworkers [17,18] have been reinterpreted to fit the framework of ideomotor theory In contemporary theoretical accounts of the ideomotor principle it is argued that the intention of bringing about an external sensory effect (e.g., the sound of a ringing doorbell) triggers the appropriate motor codes that led to the production of the effect at previous occasions (i.e., pushing the button). In the present study we report evidence suggesting that such simple one-to-one and bidirectional associations between effect representations and action representations insufficiently capture the mechanisms underlying the ideomotor principle
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
