Abstract

The security intelligence establishment of the United States in the modern era came about in response to international threats: the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the rising status as the Soviet Union as a superpower driven by an ideology in conflict with American capitalism and democracy. What follows is an examination of these origins, along with a more contemporary look at the state of U.S. intelligence, which again changed dramatically (at least on the surface) in light of further international jolts: the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the fear of Iraqi unconventional weaponry in 2002-2003. From the early to the most recent efforts to improve U.S. security intelligence, reformers have tried to overcome the pronounced centrifugal forces that have plagued the integration and coherent management of the nation’s secret agencies. This article explores why these reforms have consistently failed.

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