The Case of the Missing Democrats: Reexamining the "Republican Advantage" in Nonpartisan Elections

Abstract

uch of the scholarly attention to nonpartisan elections' has centered around the single question: are Republicans advantaged in securing nonpartisan elective positions? There is good reason for such a focus. Strong support exists for defending nonpartisan elections against the incursion of partisan politics; as recently as June 1986 California voters approved a constitutional amendment explicitly prohibiting parties from making endorsements in nonpartisan elections.2 Yet for over 30 years there also has been criticism of nonpartisan election systems centered around the argument that they tend to favor the selection of conservative Republicans, and thus tilt public policies away from the positions supported by liberals. Although such arguments are often made by Democratic candidates and their supporters, and thus have a decidedly self-interested cast, their apparent plausibility leaves nonpartisan election advocates vulnerable to charges of elitism (Morland and Hardy 1968: 88). Advocates resist these charges (see testimony in California State Legislature, Assembly Committee on Elections and Reapportionment 1985). Systematic empirical investigation is helpful in resolving the controversy about any Republican advantage, and political scientists rightly have applied