The case of the exploding perception

Abstract

My brother, whom we may call Smith, was touring the London Wax Museum. In need of information, he approached a nearby bobby. But no sooner had he started "Excuse me, sir" than he realized, to his own chagrin and his companion's amusement, that he was speaking to a figure of wax. In such a case, we may say, one experiences an 'explosion' of perception: at first Smith sees (is perceptually presen ted with) a bobby, but then that perception 'explodes' and he sees a wax figure. (The imagery stems from Husserl.1) What are we to make of such perceptual 'explosions'? From considerations of the case above, together with some related cases, we shall draw a basic account of the intentionality of perception, an account of the basic intentional or phenomenological structure of seeing an individual. Our account permits an illuminating analysis of these cases of perceptual explosion and so finds motivation and support therein. So goes part I. In part II we pursue a more precise formulation of our characterization of these cases, finding motivation and support for a central part of Hintikka's logic of perception. And in part III we consolidate the results of parts I and II by drawing on Husserl's basic approach to intentionality. An appendix pursues technical aspects in a possible-worlds framework.