The Case for Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: An Australian Case Study and Application to Nigeria

Abstract

Like many other common law countries, Nigeria imposes statutory, duties on its companies’ directors. Breaches of these duties, are expected to be enforced ‘privately’ by the company, its, shareholders or any other proper person. Despite this, evidence, suggests that in Nigeria there has been little enforcement of, directors’ duties. Consequently, this article examines whether, there is a place for public enforcement of directors’ duties. It, questions whether the failings of the private enforcement regime, necessitate a complementary enforcement regime. To address this, question, it draws on a theoretical framework, the deterrence, theory, in exploring whether public enforcement offers superior, deterrence over private enforcement. It also examines Australia, as a case study of a jurisdiction that has effectively used the, public enforcement regime for breaches of directors’ duties., Overall, it argues that to enhance enforcement, Nigeria ought, to introduce a public enforcement regime for breaches of directors’, duties. enforcement, directors’ duties, deterrence, Australia, Nigeria